Social foragers obtain food through two tactics: 'producer' searches for its food, and 'scrounger' exploits food discovered by producer. In the recent literature, two alternative producerscrounger (P-S) models have been proposed, one rate-maximizing, the other risk-sensitive. Their predictions differ about the effect of food clump density on the equilibrium proportional use of scrounger in a group. The rate-maximizing model predicts no effect, whereas the risk-sensitive model predicts that the proportional use of scrounger should increase with food clump density. These predictions were tested using wild-caught European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, in an indoor aviary. Increased food clump density resulted in significant increases in the proportional use of scrounger. Proportional use of scrounger was negatively related to food intake variance as assumed by the risk-sensitive model. Thus, scrounger is a risk-averse foraging tactic, and starlings used it in a risk-sensitive fashion. The risk-sensitive model was further challenged by testing its prediction concerning daily food requirement. When producer has a low competitive efficiency, as was found in these starlings, the risk-sensitive model predicts weakly positive effects, if any, of increased requirement on proportional use of scrounger. Results were consistent with this prediction. A significant number of starlings showed consistently positive effects of requirement on proportional use of scrounger, but the magnitude of this increase was non-significant. The results of both experiments taken together show that the proportional use of scrounger tactics within foraging groups may be a risk-sensitive, rather than a rate-maximizing, foraging tactic.
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Social foragers obtain food through two tactics: 'producer' searches for its food, and 'scrounger' exploits food discovered by producer. In the recent literature, two alternative producerscrounger (P-S) models have been proposed, one rate-maximizing, the other risk-sensitive. Their predictions differ about the effect of food clump density on the equilibrium proportional use of scrounger in a group. The rate-maximizing model predicts no effect, whereas the risk-sensitive model predicts that the proportional use of scrounger should increase with food clump density. These predictions were tested using wild-caught European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, in an indoor aviary. Increased food clump density resulted in significant increases in the proportional use of scrounger. Proportional use of scrounger was negatively related to food intake variance as assumed by the risk-sensitive model. Thus, scrounger is a risk-averse foraging tactic, and starlings used it in a risk-sensitive fashion. The risk-sensitive model was further challenged by testing its prediction concerning daily food requirement. When producer has a low competitive efficiency, as was found in these starlings, the risk-sensitive model predicts weakly positive effects, if any, of increased requirement on proportional use of scrounger. Results were consistent with this prediction. A significant number of starlings showed consistently positive effects of requirement on proportional use of scrounger, but the magnitude of this increase was non-significant. The results of both experiments taken together show that the proportional use of scrounger tactics within foraging groups may be a risk-sensitive, rather than a rate-maximizing, foraging tactic. 1996 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour When animals forage in groups, the food discoveries of some can be exploited by many (Giraldeau 1984) . Using food discovered by others is extremely common and has been reported in many vertebrate and invertebrate taxa (Barnard 1984) . Despite its widespread occurrence within foraging groups, few studies have examined the economics of this foraging decision. Barnard & Sibly (1981) proposed to model the decision as a producer-scrounger (P-S) game, in which individuals use one of two alternative foraging strategies: producer, which expends time and energy to generate opportunities for resource exploitation, or scrounger, which takes advantage of the opportunities generated and usurps some or all of the resource (Barnard & Sibly 1981; Caraco & Giraldeau 1991; Vickery et al. 1991) . The terms producer and scrounger refer to these alternative strategies for resource exploitation, and not to the individuals using those strategies. As the scrounger strategy spreads, both the producer's and scrounger's fitness decrease. The fitness of scrounger is expected to decrease at a faster rate than the fitness of producer, however, because competition within the scrounger alternative increases, and as scrounger replaces producer in the group, fewer feeding opportunities are generated per unit search time. At some proportion of scrounger, the fitness of both alternatives will be equal, corresponding to a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a state where no individual can profit by unilaterally altering its behaviour. Barnard & Sibly (1981) formulated their P-S game in general terms without specifying the currency of fitness used by players or the
